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Abstract
Value learning has been shown to modulate attention. The current study investigated
which elements of value learning (Probability or valence) influence attention. The P3 ERP
component was examined as an index of attentional resources allocated to these valued stimuli
and also as an index of the speed of processing these stimuli. Novel images were given a positive
or negative (valence) value with variable probabilities of outcome (probability) in a learning
task. Once the associations between stimuli and their expected values were made, the same
stimuli were incorporated into a perceptual discrimination task where prior value was irrelevant.
During perceptual discrimination, there was no significant increase in P3 amplitude based on
either the previously learned valence or probability of the stimuli. However, there was a
significant reduction in P3 latency for stimuli previously associated with more probable
outcomes regardless of the valence of those outcomes. These findings suggest that visual items
highly probable of an outcome utilize fewer attentional resources, allowing them to be processed
at a faster rate.
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I. Literature Review
In our environment, we are constantly presented with a wealth of visual information.
However, it is impossible for us to be able to perceive or attend to all of this incoming
information. One reason for this is that our attentional system is limited in capacity. Information
from the outside world constantly competes for our attention, and we must select which
information is deserving of our attention through a process called selective attention (Chun &
Turk-Browne, 2007). According to Broadbent's (1958) information processing model, we attend
to some information while ignoring other information, and hold the stimulus information
attended to in a short-term memory store, (i.e., working memory) where the information can be
evaluated further or used for decision making (Chun & Turk-Browne, 2007).
1. Information Processing and Attention
As we encounter a visual stimulus from the outside world, we use our eyes to focus that
image onto our retina. Our retina contains millions of nerve cells called photoreceptors that
absorb and use light to stimulate an electrochemical signal in these receptors. These
photoreceptors then send these electrical signals down a large bundle of nerve cells called the
optic nerve. Once information arrives at the optic nerve, it travels through the lateral geniculate
nucleus, a part of the thalamus that relays visual sensory information to other cortical areas. The
lateral geniculate nucleus then passes on the visual information to the primary visual cortex (V1),
an area in the brain responsible for complex visual perception, where it can then be processed

2
further via two informational processing streams, the ventral and the dorsal stream (Hubel,
1978). Visual information that has to do with object recognition enters the ventral stream and is
carried from V1 to the temporal lobe to undergo further processing. Information that refers to the
spatial characteristics of a stimulus exit V1 through the dorsal stream, which extends to the
parietal lobe for further processing (Lamme & Roelfsema, 2000; Ungerleider & Haxby, 1994).
Processing of visual information involves both bottom-up and top-down processing.
Bottom-up processing of information begins with neural activity in low-level visual areas and
continues being processed further along the visual pathway toward higher order cortices
responsible for integrating and making sense of incoming stimuli (Theeuwes, 2010). Top-down
processing of information involves processing sweeps from higher-order areas toward low-level
visual area . Bottom-up processing typically involves sensory input that captures our attention,
while top-down processing reflect characteristics that are relevant to a goal in mind, and thus
direct our attention (Connor, Egeth, & Yantis, 2004; Theeuwes, 2010).
When it comes to information processing, researchers equate bottom-up with feedforward
processing, and top-down with feedback processing (Lamme & Roelfsema, 2000). The terms
“feedforward” and “feedback” adequately represent the directional nature of these pathways.
Feedforward processing spreads information from sensory to perceptual stages (Awh, Vogel, &
Oh, 2006) and can be illustrated by the way in which the lights of an ambulance influence one’s
actions. When the lights of an ambulance are flashing, it captures attention by focusing the eye
onto the lights. Once these lights are in focus, the information is sent forward to an area that
represents the meaning of these lights, and continues to be sent forward until the individual can
react to the situation.
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Feedback processing extends information from perceptual to sensory stages (Awh et al.,
2006) and can best be explained by imagining a goal in mind such as looking for an object
among other objects. The information associated with the target object begins with the cortical
representation of the object and is sent down this directional pathway until the features of the
target object are in focus. The initial processing of a visual stimulus occurs in a feedforward
direction, with feedback processing exerting influence as early as 100 ms after (Lamme, 2004;
Theeuwes, 2010). Once feedback begins, there is recurrent processing between feedforward and
feedback directions that allow one to not only see but also interpret a stimulus (Theeuwes, 2010).
During the initial 100 ms of feedforward processing, it is the salient features of a stimulus, or the
characteristics that differentiate that stimulus from its surrounding environment, that capture
attention. Attention can undergo feedback processing once captured, allowing for goals to bias
where or what attention brings into focus. When information is encountered, it undergoes
sensory processing first, and attention is what helps filter relevant from irrelevant information
(Gentile & Jansma, 2010). Relevant information that is filtered out of the sensory store and into
other cortical areas for further processing is based on a number of factors. The information that is
considered relevant or that is successfully selected (filtered) is based on the competition between
multiple neural representations (Lamme, 2004). The neurons responsible for these neural
representations have an increased firing rate to a stimulus that is either physically salient or
attended to (Desimone & Duncan, 1995; Gentile & Jansma, 2010; Lamme, 2004). Information
can be filtered due to physical salience in a bottom-up manner, or it can be filtered due to topdown goals. The information that wins this competition gains attentional priority over the other
information. Therefore, the prioritization of information is the end result of competition.
2. Attention and Working Memory
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Information processing incorporates two overlapping constructs: attention and working
memory (WM) (Gazzaley & Nobre, 2012). Attention is the gateway to WM, giving goal-relevant
items an advantage when it comes to encoding material into memory (Awh et al., 2006).
Attention and WM both have limited capacities, however their limitations differ. Attention
selects, filters, and prioritizes information to utilize its limited space efficiently and choose what
information will be encoded into memory (Awh et al., 2006; Connor et al., 2004). WM has a
limited capacity in the amount of information that can be maintained at one time. Encoding
allows information to move into WM, and WM allows information to be updated as well as
accessed.
Attention to visual information begins after that information enters a sensory store and
before it enters WM (Cowan, 1988). Attention is the mechanism that determines which
information from this store will gain access to WM (Cowan, 1988). Once information is held in
WM (which consists only of attended items), it is manipulated, evaluated, or elaborated upon in
order to answer questions, seek further understanding, or make decisions involving this
information (Chun & Turk-Browne, 2007).
3. Attentional Selection
Attention can be captured from exogenous (external) and endogenous (internal) sources.
An exogenous stimulus involuntarily captures our attention in the visual field with its distinct
characteristics that differentiate it from surrounding stimuli. An example of this type of stimulus
could be a deer running out in front of your car, or lights flashing on an ambulance, or any
stimulus that demands attention without the conscious directing of attention to it (Yantis, &
Jonides, 1984). There are no internal processes such as expectations or personal goals that

5
manipulate the attention grabbing quality of an exogenous stimulus. Instead, it relies on external
physical characteristics to capture attention (i.e., no attached value, meaning, etc.) (Kim & Cave,
1999). This can be assumed from their distinct external physical characteristics that reflect onto
the retina and stimulate neurons in the eye. This process is thought to be automatic and beyond
one’s control (Yantis, & Jonides, 1984).
Endogenous directing of attention happens through feedback processing through the aid
of internal goals or expectations that distinguish that stimulus from others in the visual field
(Kim & Cave, 1999). An example of endogenous directing of attention would be actively
searching for a face amongst a crowd of many other faces. Although the one face that is being
searched for has similar features of other faces in the crowd, that face is found faster due to the
prior knowledge of that face and its relevance toward a processing goal of finding that person
(i.e. mother, child, enemy) (Gazzaley & Nobre, 2012). While exogenous stimuli are thought to
be automatic and attention-grabbing, endogenous stimuli can be viewed as guiding the spotlight
of attention, such as in a classic “Where’s Waldo” task. Having a goal in mind will guide
attention to a stimulus with specific attributes that are relevant to reaching that goal (Wolfe,
1994).
4. Selective Attention
It is impossible to attend to all presented stimuli, and therefore the attentional system
must select which stimuli are most relevant (Desimone & Duncan, 1995). Selective attention is
the ability to attend to relevant information while ignoring, or filtering out, irrelevant
information. A stimulus can become relevant through different ways, such as by top-down goals
or physical features. Characteristics of a stimulus that differentiate that stimulus from its
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surroundings are what make it relevant. Therefore, if a goal is in mind, the attentional system
may focus on the items relevant to that goal; however, if there is an item in the same visual field
that contains prominent physical characteristics, attention may be focused on that item. Both
items compete against each other in what is called biased competition, and it is attention that
resolves this competition by selecting which information is in need of attention.
5. Biased Competition
There are neurons in the visual cortex that respond to specific attributes of a stimulus, and
the size of the receptive fields on these neurons increase as information is processed further
along the visual pathways (i.e., dorsal, ventral). However, the more visual information that is
placed on these neural receptors, the less information about any one item we can access, and
therefore information related to both visual items compete for space in the receptive fields of the
visual processing pathways (Desimone & Duncan, 1995; Wolfe, 1994). When a target object is
in mind, WM will maintain the features associated to that target, as that target is now relevant to
the observer. However, when there are irrelevant objects that share similar physical features of
that target object, the receptive field responsible for that shared physical feature will be
overwhelmed and the two objects will be in competition with each other. Whichever object gains
attentional priority will ultimately be selected and win the competition (Desimone & Duncan,
1995).
A visual search task is a common experimental model used to manipulate attention and
shed light on how attention is biased. In a visual search task, participants are typically searching
for one target item among nontarget distractors. When the target contains physical features that
are different to the homogenous features of the nontargets, it does not experience high
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competition for the receptive fields responsible for those features and is able to be processed
fairly quickly. However, when the nontargets share physical characteristics of the target, the
receptive fields responsible for these shared characteristics now encounter a competition.
6. Attention Prioritization
As mentioned earlier, stimuli that ultimately win the competitive interaction between two
neural representations are the items that gain attentional priority. The salience, or probability, of
an item is what gives an item priority.
a. Probability
An item is considered salient when it captures greater attention than the items around it,
such as being more probable of an outcome (Parkhurst, Law, & Niebur, 2002). Due to the
attention grabbing quality of salient information, this information gains attentional priority
(Pessoa, Kastner, & Ungerleider, 2003). For example, the exogenous physical characteristics that
discriminate an object from others can make that object attentionally salient. The role that
bottom-up Probability plays in our attentional system is best explained by the aforementioned
visual search tasks. In these tasks, the targets that have physical qualities independent of the
nontargets are considered to be more salient. Treisman and Gelade (1980) found that when the
target item was less salient than its surrounding distractors, the time it took to identify the target
increased. Not surprisingly, participants were able to identify the target much faster when the
target was more salient than the distractors. It is presumed that because salience, or probability,
gains attentional priority, targets were able to be processed faster when they were more salient
(Treisman & Gelade, 1980).
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A stimulus can also be made salient due to top-down endogenous goals or expectations.
Top-down salience is dependent on the individual and what may be salient for one person may
not be for another. For example, if someone is hungry, food in their environment may be salient
to them, while a blanket may be salient to someone else who is cold (Parkhurst et al., 2002). The
effect top down salience has on visual attention is demonstrated in a real-world visual search
task. In a study by Thompson, Bichot, and Schall (2001), mammographers with varying levels of
experience in their field were compared to laypersons in the time it took them to accurately
identify breast masses in patients. Mammographic technology was used to display images of
breasts on a screen, where the mammographers and laypersons were instructed to search the
visual content and identify any breast masses as quickly as possible. The mammographers with
the most level of expertise in their field were able to complete this visual search significantly
faster than the laypersons or even other mammographers with less experience. These
experienced mammographers used their previous knowledge of what breast masses look like,
while those with less experience had a difficult time differentiating between the breast masses
and visually similar items on the screen. Because the experienced mammographers had prior
knowledge of what breast masses looked like, the masses were more salient to those individuals,
and thus gained attentional priority. Another reason the experienced mammographers may have
been able to more efficiently detect breast masses could be due to their top-down goals of
locating these masses. The features associated with breast masses became more salient because
they were relevant to a goal.
While bottom-up processing appears to be more easily measured due to the objective
quality of an exogenous stimulus, the effects of top-down processing are more complex,
requiring interpretation and leaving many questions unanswered as a result of the subjective
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characteristics of endogenous salience. Salience is how top-down processing modulates visual
attention, but the salience of a stimulus can be established in multiple ways. The present study
aims to investigate what effect top-down processing has on visual perception, with salience
created by value associations.
b. Value
It is vital to our survival that we notice stimuli that have value to us so that we can more
quickly acquire rewards and avoid punishments (Anderson, Laurent, & Yantis, 2012). Visual
items become valuable when they convey meaningful information to us, such as a monetary
reward or loss. Expected value, defined as the magnitude and probability of a desired outcome, is
a term at the crossroads of psychology and economics (Knutson, Taylor, Kaufman, Peterson, &
Glover, 2005). Expected value is acquired through learning, which takes place as we encounter
the sequential contingencies of a stimulus and the outcome following that stimulus. The strength
of the paired association between a stimulus and its outcome increases with each instance it is
experienced (Mackintosh, 1975). Establishing the expected value of a stimulus can be explained
in a simple formula. The expected value is equal to the expected value given to that association
previously, plus a learning rate of how quickly our predictions have been updated, and a
prediction error term, measuring the accuracy of the prediction made (Gottlieb, 2012). Neurons
in the parietal cortex responsible for encoding the selection of a stimulus are presumed to
consistently modulate this value representation and send this information in a top-down direction
to the motor cortex, where the individual can then choose the most advantageous action to take
in order to maximize their rewards (Gottlieb, 2012). Value prioritizes attention by creating
representations in the brain that have consistently paired a stimulus with a desired outcome.
Value and reward have been prioritized in attention since infancy. Humans have an innate desire
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to acquire valuable stimuli such as food, water, and sex. Prioritizing items that have been learned
to acquire value helps the attentional system more efficiently select information and utilize fewer
attentional resources (Anderson, Laurent, & Yantis, 2013).
c. Valence
Attention prioritizes information that has a positive or negative valence attached to it,
such as punishments and losses or rewards and gains (Buchner, Rothermund, Wentura, & Mehl,
2004; Pessoa & Ungerleider, 2004). It is valuable to be able to distinguish between negatively
and positively associated stimuli in our environment so that we can make rapid decisions that
keep us away from dangerous situations and close to safety or familiarity (Öhman & Mineka,
2001).
The valence of a stimulus biases our attentional resources towards that stimulus due to
the valuable information it provides (Pessoa & Ungerleider, 2004). Valuable information is
prioritized above information that is neutral. However, when attentional resources are limited,
positively valenced stimuli are prioritized in the attentional system over negatively valenced
stimuli (Raymond & O'Brien, 2009). In a study investigating the effects of valence on attention,
participants made associations between stimuli (faces) and monetary values during a learning
phase. Faces associated with specific monetary outcomes were then incorporated into an
attentional blink (AB) task. In an AB task, a series of visual images rapidly flash on a computer
screen one after the other. The participant is instructed to focus their attention on two visual
targets. Because attentional resources are allotted to the first target, participants typically do not
report recognition of a second target that appears in close proximity to the first target. In other
words, attention “blinks” during the display of the second target. When the time between the
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presentation of the first and second target was short, valence determined the AB effect. More
specifically, when attentional resources were limited, the items previously associated with loss or
neutral outcomes were not recognized as often as items that were associated with gain outcomes.
This alone shows the impact value has on attention. Even though the task was completely
unrelated to the associated value of the stimuli, the previously learned value impacted the
processing of these stimuli (Raymond & O'Brien, 2009). These findings strengthen the existing
argument that valence, as a learned value, influences attention prioritization.
Research on emotion and attention gives great insight as to how positive and negative
valences in the form of emotions influence attention as well (Pessoa & Ungerleider, 2004). To
test the impact emotional valence has on attention, researchers used a modified Stroop task, a
task that displays color words either in their color or in a different color. This particular Stroop
task contained negative adjectives, positive adjectives, and neutral adjectives. Participants had
longer reaction times when naming the color of the valenced words than the neutral words, and
had an even longer reaction time when naming the negative adjectives compared to the positive
adjectives (Pratto, 1994 as cited in Buchner et al., 2004). In a Stroop task, the longer the reaction
time in naming the color of the word, the more interference one is experiencing. The argument
could be made that these individuals are subjected to interference by virtue of the valenced
words capturing attentional resources.
Studies indexing attention through reaction times that involve emotionally significant
stimuli help build a strong case for the effect of value on attention. Emotions are innate and their
values do not have to be learned in a previous task. Therefore, many experiments utilize
emotionally charged stimuli to represent valence. The previous experiment demonstrates the
ability of valenced stimuli to capture attention. Just as the faces associated with positive
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outcomes in the previous study allow for better recognition and thus capture attention, the
adjectives associated to negative emotions also captured attention, which is shown through
increased reaction times when naming the color of those specific adjectives.
There is ongoing debate as to how valenced stimuli are processed. Some researchers
believe that valenced stimuli are not automatically processed, but instead they shift our
attentional resources to the valenced information (Buchner et al., 2004; Rothermund, 2003). In
other words, valence does not necessarily demand attention, but requires our attention in order to
have any influence on the processing of information (Pessoa & Ungerleider, 2004). However,
there also exists research in support of the idea that valence does not require attention and is
processed automatically (e.g., Bargh & Tota, 1988; Meng, Yuan, & Li, 2009)). In an eventrelated potential (ERP) study, which measures the electrical brain activity during a specific
event, researchers found increased negative activity in the N2 component when participants were
shown negatively-valenced images as opposed to neutral images. Importantly, this activity was
elicited at 150-200 milliseconds post stimulus representation, a time period that represents
unconscious visual awareness of a stimulus (Del Cul, Baillet, & Dehaene, 2007; Meng et al.,
2009). If valenced information is processed at such an early stage, it may have an impactful topdown influence on attention by automatically choosing which information in our visual field is
important and deserving of limited attentional resources.
d. Reward
As previously stated, human beings have an inherent drive to acquire the maximum
reward in any given situation. By cause of this, individual's’ attentional resources have adapted
to give rewarding information a perceptual advantage to make the processing of vast amounts of
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visual information more efficient (Anderson et al., 2013). Studies repeatedly show that when a
stimulus is learned to have a rewarding value, it is prioritized in our attentional system beyond
other valued stimuli (Anderson et al., 2012; Anderson et al., 2013; Lee & Shomstein, 2010;
Raymond & O'Brien, 2009; Shomstein & Johnson, 2013). Della Libera and Chelazzi (2009)
demonstrated the effect reward has on attention prioritization with an object identification task.
Participants engaged in a learning task prior to the object identification task to associate certain
shapes with rewards or losses.
In the experiment, participants were shown a cue (red or green square) followed by a
presentation of a fixation cross in the center of the screen. Two shapes were shown to the left of
the fixation cross, one red and one green. The shapes overlapped each other while remaining
fully visible. To the right of the fixation was one shape in black. Participants were instructed to
judge if the shape on the right of the fixation in black matched the target. The target was defined
as the shape on the left of the fixation that matches the color of the square prior to its appearance.
Participants must filter out the overlapping distractor shape in order to complete the task.
In the training phase, participants were given a monetary reward for correct judgment
trials. Some shapes had a higher probability of reward (80% of correct trials) while others had a
low probability of reward (20% of correct trials). Several days later, participants completed the
same study with the absence of reward. This testing phase consisted of the exact same shapes in
the training phase. The dependent measure was the reaction time in making a correct judgment.
The target shapes previously associated with a high probability of reward in the training
phase that became distractors in the experimental task made judgment reaction times increase
significantly, while shapes previously associated with a lower probability of reward in the

14
training phase that became distractors in the experimental task showed no increase in reaction
times when making a judgment. Reaction times provided strong evidence that reward does
become prioritized in the attentional system (Della Libera & Chelazzi, 2009).
Attentional bias within our visual system has also been associated with reward in studies
involving drug users and addicts (Lubman, 2000). Methadone-dependent and control participants
differ substantially in their performance on a probe detection task. A probe detection task
involves the presence of two pictures on a screen with each picture corresponding to a specific
location (left, right). Following the presentation of the two pictures is a probe, which in this
experiment is a dot, in one of the picture’s locations. The participant must choose as quickly as
possible the location in which the probe appeared. The pictures in the task illustrated by Lubman
and colleagues (2000) varied between control pictures, drug-related pictures, and neutral
pictures. The participants who were methadone-dependent showed significantly faster reaction
times than controls to probes replacing the location of drug-related pictures than any other
pictures. It is presumed that these drug-related pictures cue reward for the addicts and thus bias
their attention to that location.
Another study conducted by Gross, Jarvik, and Rosenblatt (1993) provides additional
evidence for reward related attentional bias through a Stroop task. In this task, participants were
all addicted to nicotine; however, half of them abstained from smoking any nicotine for 12 hours.
For this experiment, the color words were replaced with neutral words or smoking-related words,
and participants were instructed to name the color of the word as quickly as possible. As
expected, the addicts who had sustained from smoking any nicotine for at least 12 hours had
significantly slower reaction times than the other participants to the smoking-related words than
the neutral words. It is suggested that this interference is due to the meaning of these smoking-
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related words capturing attention. Due to the rewarding value the smoking-related words have on
these participants, they are more likely to capture attention. If the participant values the actual
word, he or she will focus more on the word and not the color of the word. Neutral words have
no rewarding value to these participants and thus do not require attentional resources, thus
allowing for attention to be allocated to the color of those words. Participants who have
abstained from smoking will find smoking-related words more rewarding than those that have
just smoked nicotine and thus already acquired their nicotine associated reward (Gross et al.,
1993).
In visual perception, covert attention is defined as the rapid processing of items in the
foveal region compared to those items in the periphery (Henderson, Pollatsek, & Rayner, 1989).
Several visual experiments illustrate that covert attention facilitates eye movements toward an
object (Deubel & Schneider, 1996; Kowler, Anderson, Dosher, & Blaser, 1995). In order to
focus and sharpen an image, the image must stimulate the fovea, a part of the eye that is
responsible for acuity. Subsequently, it should be of no surprise that the eye fixates on locations
consisting of high attentional priority (Thompson & Bichot, 2005). Anderson and Yantis (2012)
measured eye movements during a judgment task involving reward. In the learning phase, the
participants were shown an array of different colored circles with a single bar enclosed inside
each of them. The red colored circle was the target, and if the participant correctly identified the
bar in the target circle as being either vertically or horizontally oriented, they would acquire a
monetary reward. In the testing phase following the learning phase, all of the same colored
circles were present, except this time one of the circles was a different shape, such as a diamond.
Participants were given the same instructions, but the target in the test phase was no longer the
red circle, instead it was the blue diamond. Upon evaluating participants’ eye fixations during the
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testing phase, Anderson and Yantis (2012) discovered that the distractor in the testing phase
responsible for monetary value in the learning phase was far more likely to be fixated on than the
target. These results were supported by behavioral data collected during the same experiment. In
the testing phase, participants had slower reaction times when the value-associated circle was
present. Based on the aforementioned study and its conclusions, it appears as though items that
have been previously associated with reward bias spatial attention allocation and are even
capable of doing so when they are task-irrelevant and no longer possess rewarding value
(Anderson et al., 2013).
II. Measuring Top-Down Influences on Attention
To be able to measure the effect of attention on the amount of attentional resources being
allocated, or on the speed of processing this information, relevant to attention, the instrument
used must have exceptional temporal resolution. ERPs reflect ongoing brain activity centered on
a particular event in time and are very sensitive to the timing of mental processes (on the order of
ms). ERPs are extracted from continuous data collected using electroencephalography (EEG).
EEG measures the electrical activity emitted from clusters of nerve cells, or neurons, in the
cerebral cortex within one to five milliseconds of firing (Gevins, Smith, McEvoy, Leong, & Le,
1999; Hulbert, 1947). Electrodes are applied externally onto the scalp and amplify the electricity
caused by the firing of neurons. The activity recorded from the EEG is then represented in
waveforms (Hulbert, 1947). The EEG recording collects data from a variety of neurons that are
firing in response to many different events. In order to more clearly identify the electrical pattern
of activity responsible for a specific event or occurrence, researchers average all of the electrical
activity that occurs centered around that event. The averaged waveform that emerges from this
process is called an ERP. ERPs are an important measure in the field of neuroscience due to their
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continuous recording of neural activity in the brain, making it easier to identify which phase in
perceptual or post-perceptual cognitive processing has been influenced by an experimental
manipulation.
Years of research using ERPs have provided a wealth of knowledge regarding the
meaning of these common waveforms and in which instances they are observed. These
waveforms are comprised of positive and negative deviations in voltage occurring at different
times throughout the processing of an event. These deviations reflect the difference in voltage
from baseline, or prestimulus activity. Therefore, the P components are above baseline, while N
components are below baseline. Each positive peak in the wave is followed by a negative peak,
and thus P1 comes prior to N1. The number corresponds to the timing the peak took place. For
example, the P1 component, or P100, is a positive deflection that begins at 100 milliseconds post
stimulus onset. While this component is detected early on in the processing stages, it should
come as no surprise that it is responsible for the processing of sensory information, or exogenous
features of a stimulus. However, the P3 component (positive peak beginning at 300 milliseconds)
is often influenced by the endogenous features of a stimulus, as it occurs later in processing
(Luck, 2005).
The interpretation of these components typically lies in the size and measurements of the
amplitude and latency of a particular component. Amplitudes are used to measure the size of the
underlying component (Sur & Sinha, 2009). For the P3 component, for example, a larger
amplitude typically reflects an increase in the amount of cognitive effort utilized during a distinct
event in time. Particular to P3, the latency reveals the difficulty of the task. For example, if the
P3 latency is short for a participant during a trial, this would mean the task is relatively easy or
that the participant has performed exceptionally well with little mental effort on a difficult task
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(Sur & Sinha, 2009). The key to interpreting the meaning of these latencies and amplitudes lies
in the theoretical framework that underlies the study at hand.
The P3 component is one of the most complex to interpret because there is no universal
agreement on what the P3 wave actually reflects (Luck, 2005). Studies have shown that it
reflects the updating of one’s representation of the surrounding environment, while others
believe it is an index of attention. A multitude of studies have helped solidify the attention
allocation hypothesis of the P3. Isreal, Chesney, Wickens, and Donchin (1980) interpret the P3
amplitude as an index of attention by discovering that a subject must attend to a stimulus in order
to elicit a P3. When participants were given a concurrent task of visually tracking items on a
screen while simultaneously counting tones presented to them, the P3 amplitude decreased
significantly compared to when participants were solely tracking visual stimuli. Due to the
reduced attention given to any one task, the P3 wave logically decreased.
The P3 component is also cited in studies as being related to reward processing (Pfabigan
et al., 2014; Yeung & Sanfey, 2004). Yeung and Sanfey (2004) conducted an experiment to
measure the P3 component in participants engaged in a virtual gambling task. Participants were
shown two different colored squares with one on either side of a central fixation point. The two
squares were to mimic two randomly selected cards in a deck of four cards (red, green, blue,
purple). The participants were instructed to choose any square at random, and were then given
feedback of their monetary gain or loss for choosing that specific card. After receiving feedback
on their selection, the monetary value of the other card appeared on the screen to show the
participant what the alternative outcome would have been if they had chosen the other card. Two
of the cards were always respective of large outcomes (gains or losses) while the other two cards
were always associated with small outcomes. The researchers found a significant main effect of
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increased P3 amplitude for magnitude of outcome. This means that the peak of the P3 component
was largest in response to larger outcomes than smaller outcomes, whether gains or losses, when
receiving feedback on their chosen card. Therefore, the argument can be made that the cards
associated with greater outcomes allocated more attentional resources.
There was no significant effect of valence on the P3 component for this particular
proportion of Yeung and Sanfey’s (2004) study. However, when observing the alternative
outcome of the unchosen card, there was not only a main effect of magnitude and of valence on
the P3, but also an interaction between the two. The P3 amplitude increased as larger alternative
outcomes were observed, particularly when the larger outcomes were positive values. Due to the
increased P3 component in reward processing of attained and unattained outcomes, it is possible
that the P3 is involved in the coding of reward, whether that reward is obtained or not (Yeung &
Sanfey, 2004).
In a similar study conducted by Goldstein and colleagues (2006), the P3 amplitude was
measured in response to varying incentive values in a “Go/No-Go” task. A Go/No-go task is
when the participant must push a button or lever in response to the onset of a stimulus in the
“Go” condition, or the participant must refrain from responding in the “No-go” condition.
Participants were shown on a screen the amount of monetary reward (0¢, 1¢, or 45¢) earned if
they accurately complete the trial. Once participants are shown how much money they can
potentially earn, they are shown a picture that is either indicative of a “Go” condition or a “Nogo” condition. Following the presentation of the picture, a target appears and the participant must
respond to the target according to the present condition. When participants engaged in a trial
where the reward was 45¢, their P3 amplitude (measured at the onset of the image cueing for a
“Go” or “No-go” condition) significantly increased in comparison to trials with a potential
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reward of 0¢ of 1¢. The amplitude of the P3 wave correlated with the reward values with the
largest peak to the cued stimuli occurring in response to the largest value condition and the
smallest peak in response to the smallest value condition.
A third study that is most convincing of the influence of reward on P3 correlates ERP
data with functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) data (Pfabigan et al., 2014). An fMRI
is another noninvasive instrument used to measure brain activity. It is presumed that neurons that
are active and firing utilize blood, and blood requires oxygen. This brain activity is analyzed
using a BOLD (blood-oxygenation level dependent) signal and the stronger the BOLD signal, the
greater brain activity in that specific area. In this particular study, demonstrated by Pfabigan and
colleagues (2014), participants were given a monetary incentive delay task in order to measure
ERPs and fMRI activity in the anticipation phase of reward. Participants were shown a cue
associated with either a monetary gain or avoidance of a loss on a screen and were then
instructed to complete the trial correctly to obtain that reward. A question mark replaced the cue
and preceded a target stimulus (black square) in which participants were required to respond to
as quickly as possible. Results from the fMRI BOLD signals displayed increased brain activity in
areas associated with reward. The observed ERP data revealed that the largest amplitude in the
P3 component was in response to the gain incentive cues compared to the loss and neutral cues.
However, the P3 still had increased amplitude for loss incentive cues in comparison to neutral
cues as well. Most interestingly is the correlation the researchers noticed between the ERP and
the fMRI data. The larger the P3 amplitude, the more pronounced the BOLD signal in the reward
related areas of the brain (Pfabigan et al., 2014).
Research also supports an effect of learned probability on attention and the speed of
processing, facilitating in the theory behind measuring probability effects via the P3 component.
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Using the same learning task and stimuli as Raymond and O’Brien (2009), O’Brien and
Raymond (2012), found significant effects of learned probability on the processing speed of
these learned stimuli when subsequently encountered in a backward masking task. Participants
associated face stimuli with specific monetary wins or losses of high or low probability
occurrence. Once participants learned the expected values of these particular faces, the same
faces were then shown individually (intermixed among a set of novel faces) for a brief period of
time (~20 – 100 ms) and then replaced with a visual mask. Participants were able to make an
old/new judgment for faces previously associated with high probability after a duration
significantly shorter than the faces that were not highly probable of an outcome or that were
novel. Interestingly, there was no effect of valence on the amount of time needed to view the
face before being masked (O’Brien & Raymond, 2012).
III. Current Study
The current study is interested in the influence that learned value has on the amount of
attentional resources utilized in processing stimuli and the speed of processing stimuli. The P3
ERP component is the tool that will be used to indicate whether value has effectively influenced
the processing speed or allocation of attentional resources of a stimulus. As mentioned earlier,
reward can capture one’s attention and thus has an effect on the size of the P3 wave. If the
hypothesis of this study is correct, there should be significantly larger amplitudes for the
rewarding versus punishing stimuli and for stimuli that are of high probability compared to low
probability due to the additional attention these stimuli require. Previous research supports the
idea of P3 latency indexing stimulus-processing speed (Kutas, McCarthy, & Donchin, 1977).
Therefore, there should also be reduced latencies for stimuli associated with high probability
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than that of low probability, suggesting that highly probable items are processed faster (O’Brien
& Raymond, 2012).
Participants first engaged in a learning task where they associated particular faces with a
monetary gain (reward), a monetary loss (punishment), or no monetary outcome. In addition to
valence, probability was also manipulated. Some faces had a rewarding or punishing value 20%
of the time (and no outcome 80% of the time); other faces had these values 80% of the time (and
no outcome 20% of the time). The valence of a stimulus in this study is referred to as Gain, Loss,
or Neutral, while the probability of that valence outcome is referred to as High or Low. The
combination of these two resulted in five expected values: High Gain, Low Gain, High Loss,
Low Loss, and Neutral.
After participants completed the learning task, EEG was then recorded during completion
of a perceptual discrimination task that incorporated the stimuli previously associated with
reward or punishment. In the perceptual discrimination task, participants viewed the previously
learned faces and indicated which direction the faces were tilted (left, right). As highlighted
earlier, it is hypothesized that faces that were previously associated with a monetary gain or loss,
and/or of high probability will elicit a P3 wave that has an increased amplitude in comparison to
when the participants are making a perceptual decision for the faces that did not increase or
decrease their monetary value and/or have a low probability. This would mean that in
congruence with previous literature, stimuli that have been previously associated with value
continues to influence information processing even when the value of that stimulus is no longer
relevant. Additionally, one could presume this effect due to items that are valuable having an
attention capturing or grabbing quality that allows them to win in biased competition. This can
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be evidenced by the increased amplitude in P3, which has not only been shown in increased
attention but also with sensitivity to reward and value in general.
If the aforementioned theory supporting the idea of P3 latency indexing stimulusprocessing speed is correct, there should be a significantly smaller latency in either the valence
or high probability conditions. A reduced latency toward stimuli that are of rewarding value
(High Gain, Low Gain) compared to punishing value (High Loss, Low Loss) regardless of
probability, should be present if rewarding stimuli truly requires a reduced amount of time to
process. However, it is possible that there will instead be an effect of probability. A reduced
latency for stimuli that are highly probable (High Gain, High Loss) regardless of valence, as
opposed to stimuli that provide an outcome less frequently would provide evidence congruent
with the literature regarding processing speed and salience (O’Brien &Raymond, 2012; Treisman
& Gelade, 1980). This would suggest that the brain can process information that is more
probable of an outcome at a faster rate than information that is less probable of an outcome
(Kutas et al., 1977).
IV. Method
1. Participants
Seventy-three right-handed undergraduate students between ages 18-31 (M = 19.40)
attending the University of South Florida were given course credit for their participation in the
study. All participants gave informed consent prior to their participation. Participants were not
included in the final sample if they did not meet criteria for learning, performed below chance in
the perceptual discrimination task, or had unusable EEG data (as detailed below). A final sample
size of thirty-nine was used in the data analysis.
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2. Stimuli
The faces used in both tasks were static computer-generated (GenHead 1.2; Genemation,
Inc., Manchester, England), gray-scale faces of young adult males and measured 2.9° x 3.6°. The
same stimuli used in both tasks (described below) were presented on a Dell Optiplex monitor (51
cm) at a viewing distance of 52 centimeters. All tasks and stimuli were presented using E-prime
2.0 (Schneider, Eschman, & Zuccolotto, 2012).
3. Learning Task
In this phase of the experiment, two faces were shown simultaneously on the computer
screen with one face located in the top center of the screen and the other in the bottom center of
the screen. Participants were instructed to press either the “t” key for top, or the “b” key for
bottom upon the display of the faces. On the very first trial, participants chose a face at random.
After their selection, the face they chose either awarded them money (Gain), took money away
(Loss), or did not affect their total outcome (Neutral). Some faces were more likely to award
money than others (80% of the time, 20% no outcome) while other faces were less likely to
award money than others (20% of the time, 80% no outcome), and likewise some faces were
more likely to take away money (80% of the time, 20% no outcome) while other faces were less
likely to take away money (20% of the time, 80% no outcome). Faces in the Neutral condition
always resulted in no monetary outcome. There were 200 trials for each of the Gain, Loss, and
Neutral conditions, equaling a total of 600 trials. This task was untimed and participants chose
the faces at their own pace. Over time, participants were expected to learn the values of these
faces. Participants who chose the optimal face in at least 55% of the last 30 trials for each
condition were considered to have learned the values of the faces. Twenty-two participants were
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not included in the final sample because they did not meet criterion for learning. This portion of
the experiment was analyzed behaviorally; there is no EEG recording for this data.
4. Perceptual Discrimination Task
Upon completion of the learning phase, participants began a perceptual discrimination
task that incorporated the same faces in the previous learning phase. In this task, participants
were instructed to focus on a fixation cross in the center of the screen. On each trial, one of the
faces from the learning phase was presented in either the top left or the top right of the screen.
Each face was either tilted 45 degrees to the left or the right. Participants were instructed to press
the “1” key if the face was tilted to the left and the “4” key if the face was tilted to the right.
There were a total of 300 trials in this portion of the experiment, evenly distributed between
conditions (High Gain, High Loss, Low Gain, Low Loss, Neutral). Within each condition, 150
trials had faces tilted to the left, and 150 trials had faces tilted to the right, and within the 150
trials, 75 of those trials presented faces in the left visual field while the additional 75 trials
presented faces in the right visual field. There were a total of 1200 trials. This task contained 12
blocks, with 100 trials within each block. There was a break between each block and participants
were instructed to take as much time as needed during each break. Participants were instructed to
respond to the presentation of the stimulus as quickly as possible. Ten participants were not
included in the final sample because they performed below chance on the discrimination task.
5. EEG Recording
Continuous EEG data were acquired using a 128-channel (including eye channels) EGI
system (Electrical Geodesics, Inc.) sampled at 250 Hz, referenced to the CZ electrode. All EEG
data were filtered offline with a 0.1 Hz high-pass filter and a 20 Hz low-pass filter. Waveforms
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were segmented into 1000 millisecond epochs spanning 200 milliseconds before presentation of
a tilted face to 800 milliseconds after the presentation. Individual ERPs were baseline corrected
over the 200 millisecond pre-stimulus period and referenced to averaged mastoids. Netstation 5.0
(EGI, USA) Artifact Detection tool marked channels exceeding 200 µV as bad for the entire
segment. After running an algorithm detecting and discarding bad eye channels, Netstation 5.0
Perform Inferences tool marked any threshold-violations greater than 140 µV as eye blinks and
greater than 55 µV as eye movements in the remaining data. Artifact Detection also marked
channels bad for all segments if the channel was bad for at least 20 percent of segments.
Segments were marked bad if they contained more than 10 bad channels, an eye blink, or an eye
movement. NetStations’s Bad Channel Replacement tool replaced bad channels in good
segments with data from surrounding electrodes. All bad channels were excluded when
referencing was averaged to the Mastoids. Mean amplitude and peak latency for the P3 were
taken from oddball-minus-frequent difference waves (collapsed across visual field) 300-356 ms
post-target onset at midline parietal electrode Pz.
6. Data Analysis
Mean latencies and amplitudes were first analyzed in a one-way analysis of variance
(ANOVA) with expected value (High Gain, Low Gain, High Loss, Low Loss, Neutral) as the
within-subjects factor, followed by a two-way repeated-measures ANOVA with valence (Gain,
Loss) and probability (High, Low) as the within subjects factors. Greenhouse-Geisser corrections
were used where applicable. Bonferroni post-hoc analyses were used to follow-up significant
effects in ANOVA analyses. Six participants were not included in the data analyses because of
unusable EEG data.
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V. Results
1. Behavioral Data
a. Learning Task
On average, participants correctly chose the High Gain face 87.36% (SD = 0.12) of the
time, the Low Loss face 76.75% (SD = 0.12) of the time, and chose one of the two Neutral faces
42.30% (SD = 0.28) of the time across the last thirty trials during the learning task (Table A2;
Figure A1). A paired samples t-test was conducted to compare the learning rates for ‘Gain’ and
‘Loss’ faces. Participants learned the ‘Gain’ faces significantly better than the ‘Loss’ faces, t(44)
= 5.90, p = <.001 (Table A1).
b. Perceptual Discrimination Task
Participants performed at 94% (SD = .03) accuracy for all five (High Gain, Low Gain,
High Loss, Low Loss, Neutral) conditions. There was no significant effect of expected value on
behavioral performance (Table A3; Figure A2), F(2.89, 121.40) = 0.09, p = 0.960. Means and
standard deviations are shown in Table A4.
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2. ERP Results
Figure 3 shows the grand average of all subjects included in the final analyses (N= 39) at
the midline parietal electrode (Pz) during the perceptual discrimination task in which the time
window (300-356 ms) was decided on for further analyses of amplitude and latency.
a. P3 Amplitude
There was no significant effect of expected value on mean amplitude (see Table A5 and
Figure A4), F(3.19, 102.16) = 1.91, p = 0.13. Means and standard deviations are shown in Table
A6. When comparing the effects of valence and probability on P3 amplitude, there was
insufficient evidence to conclude that valence (Figure 5) F(1, 32) = 0.62, p = 0.42, or probability
(Figure A6) F(1, 32) = 0.62, p = 0.44, had an effect (Table A7). Means and standard errors for
valence and probability can be found in Tables A8 and A9 respectively. There was no
interaction between probability and valence on mean amplitude.
b. P3 Latency
There was no significant effect of expected value on mean latency (Figure A8), F(3.29,
105.17) = 1.88, p = 0.13. Means and standard deviations are shown in Table A10. However,
when comparing the effects of valence and probability on latency (Table 12), there was no
significant effect of valence, F(1, 32) = 1.09, p = .304 (Table A13; Figure A9), but there was a
significant main effect of probability, F(1, 32) = 5.63, p = .024 (Table A14; Figure A10), with
the high probability condition (M = 328.06, SE = 3.28) eliciting significantly reduced mean
latencies in P3 compared to the low probability condition (M = 333.76, SE = 3.15). There was no
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significant interaction of valence and probability on mean latency (Figure A11), F(1, 32) = .01, p
= .914.
VI. Discussion
In this study, a forced-choice learning task was used to imbue novel stimuli with different
expected values. Faces that have never been seen before by the participants were associated with
positive and negative expected values of high and low probability depicted through monetary
outcomes. The purpose of this study was to investigate the effect of value learning on the speed
of processing and the amount of resources allocated to that processing. In this particular study,
value is considered the valence, probability, or combination of both that a stimulus holds. In
most studies, the value of valence is manipulated through emotion. However, to eliminate any
previous influence learning might have on value, learning was established with novel stimuli in
this experiment. Although the stimuli used were faces, there were no emotions expressed. If a
participant met learning criteria, they learned to associate each face with either a gain, loss, or
neutral monetary value. For each loss- and gain-associated face, they learned to associate it with
either a high (80%) or low (20%) probability of outcome. Once participants completed the
learning task, they completed a perceptual discrimination task that incorporated the same faces
from the previous task with learned value now task irrelevant.
The goal of the study was to determine whether the learned value of a stimulus has an
effect on the attentional processing of that stimulus when reencountered. The ERP component
we looked at as an index of attention was the P3. The amplitude (or magnitude) of the P3 is
associated with the amount of attentional resources allocated to a stimulus, or event. The latency
(or duration) of the P3 corresponds to the processing speed of a stimulus, or event. Therefore,
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both elements were critical to examine when exploring the effects of attentional capture,
selection, biased competition, and other facets of attentional top-down processing. The a priori
hypotheses that we expected to find are as follows; a) there will be a significant increase in P3
amplitude for valence (gain vs. loss faces), b) there will be a significant increase in P3 amplitude
for probability (high vs. low probability faces), c) there will be a significant increase in P3
latency for valence, d) there will be a significant increase in P3 latency for probability.
Having a significant increase in P3 amplitude for the value of valence or probability
would suggest that items of either valence or of probability allocated more attentional resources,
or effort. This could be interpreted as valenced or items of probability gaining attentional priority
or having won biased competition. Previous literature has provided evidence that stimuli of high
probability have elicited a larger P3 amplitude than items that are less probable (Kok, 2001). In
our results, we did not see a significant increase or decrease in P3 amplitude for probability or
valence. While the P3 ERP component is one of the most researched components in psychology,
it still has many different interpretations due to its complexity. Although one would presume that
more difficult tasks require more attention and processing effort, many studies have shown a
decrease in P3 amplitude when the difficulty of a task increases (Kok, 2001). This is an
interesting finding as it could explain the null effects found in our study. Perhaps there was an
increase in amplitude due to probability, but the task also reached a point of difficulty that in turn
caused the amplitude to decrease as well. If this were the case in our study, any effects would
dissipate.
While none of our apriori hypotheses held true for the effects of value learning on the P3
amplitude, or amount of resources given to a stimulus, this is not the case when inspecting P3
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latency. When it comes to valence (gain, loss) there is no significant increase in P3 latency;
however, there is when it comes to probability (high, low). Regardless of the valence of the
faces, faces that were associated with high probabilities (high gain, high loss), had a decreased
P3 latency. As previously mentioned, the latency of the P3 component translates to the
processing speed during a task. Therefore, information that is highly salient is processed at a
more rapid speed than information that is not as salient. This fits well with literature regarding
the effect of salient features in a visual search task. As discussed earlier, Treisman and Gelade
(1980) discovered that participants had faster reaction times to targets in a visual search that had
features more salient than the distractors. Also, participants had decreased reaction times to
targets when they had features less salient than the distractors. Although this study focuses
purely on bottom-up salience, it is still salience nonetheless. In a study by Raymond and O’Brien
(2009), participants exhibited better recognition for items of high-probability in an AB task,
regardless of valence. In an AB task, the second target (T2) should not be recognized due to our
attention ‘blinking’ during that target because it is presumed to still be processing the first target,
The fact that T2 was recognized only when it consisted of a salient stimulus, provides evidence
that salience, or probability, does have an attention-capturing quality. Raymond and O’Brien
(2009) provide evidence of top-down salience impacting attentional capture.
In conclusion, salient information such as information that is more probable of an
outcome is processed more quickly because it may capture attention. The salient features of these
faces were endogenous, meaning they were salient due to the relevant information they provided,
and not due to any physical characteristics that demanded attention. During top-down processing,
the salient features were processed quick enough in order to have an effect on feedback
processing. Therefore, the learned associations of these faces (salience) were relevant enough to
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influence the speed of feedback processing with the aid of internal goals in mind. According to
the theory of selective attention (Triesman & Gelade, 1980), we must select information that is
relevant while ignoring, or filtering out, information that is irrelevant. If a goal is in mind, the
attentional system focuses on the items relevant to that goal and selects those items for further
processing. For this reason, we can presume that salient stimuli are more relevant than nonsalient items regardless of valence. Positive and negative outcomes do not provide information as
meaningful as the magnitude of those outcomes. From the perspective of biased competition,
information that is salient or more probable of an outcome, wins the competition between items
that are less salient and thus, gains attentional priority.
A real world example of how these findings implicate processing could be that we will
attend to an item in our visual field that is more informative of an outcome no matter whether the
outcome is positive or negative. This is interesting because it tells us that we value the likelihood
of a negative outcome just as much as we value the likelihood of a positive outcome. For
example, when choosing between two items, you are just as interested in the item that will
provide you the greatest loss as you are in the item that will provide you with the greatest gain.
Future replication should explore these effects in a task that is less difficult than the
perceptual discrimination task. In the task that was used in the current experiment, it is possible
that the faces were shown at a rate that was too fast for accurate comprehension, or that the faces
were too distorted to the participant when they were tilted. If the difficulty of the discrimination
task could be reduced, then we may see an effect of learned value on P3 amplitude. It would also
be beneficial to manipulate task difficulty. Perhaps there could be a between-subjects variable of
task difficulty that would allow us to see if the theory of task difficulty washing out attentional
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capacity effects has any merit. It would also be helpful to study the effect of bottom-up versus
top-down salience on the rate of processing to see if top-down influences are powerful enough to
gain priority over bottom-up salience. All in all, the effect of salience on attention seems to be
replicated repeatedly throughout the P3 literature. However, most studies indicate the influence
of salience on P3 amplitude, while our study is more unique in its finding of the effects of
salience on P3 latency.
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Appendix A: Tables
Tables
Table A1. Paired-samples t-test of ‘Gain’ and ‘Loss’ values

Mean
Gain Loss

SD

.11

SEM

.12

.02

Sig. (2tailed)

t

df

5.90

44.00

.000

Table A2. Means and standard deviations for learning rates of ‘Gain’ and ‘Loss’ values
Gain

Mean
.87

N
45.00

SD
.12

Loss

.77

45.00

.12

Table A3. One-way analysis of variance for behavioral accuracy of value
	
  	
  
Value

SS
4.37E-05

df
2.89E+00

MS
1.51E-05

Error(Value)

1.95E-02

1.21E+02

1.61E-04

F
.094

Sig.
.960

Table A4. Means and standard deviations for behavioral accuracy of value
Value
HG

Mean
.94

SD

N
.04

39

LG

.94

.03

39

HL

.94

.03

39

LL

.94

.03

39

N

.94

.03

39

Table A5. One-way analysis of variance for mean amplitude of value
Source
Value

SS
9.022

df

MS

3.192

2.826

Error(Value)

151.221

102.16

1.48

Total

160.243

105.352

4.306

F
1.909

Sig.
0.129
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Table A6. Means and standard deviations for mean amplitude of value

Value

Mean

SD

N

High Gain

3.91

2.52

33

High Loss

4.26

2.48

33

Low Gain

3.95

2.72

33

Low Loss

3.91

3.08

33

Neutral

3.53

2.39

33

Table A7. Analysis of variance for mean amplitude of probability and valence

Source

SS

Salience
Error (Salience)

Salience * Valence
Error (Salience*Valence)
Total

MS

.785

1

.785

40.259

32

1.258

.857

1

.857

41.380

32

1.293

1.285

1

1.285

28.512

32

.891

113.078

99

6.369

Valence
Error (Valence)

df

F

Sig.
.624

.435

.662

.422

1.442

.239

Table A8. Means and standard errors for mean amplitude of valence
Valence

Mean

Std. Error

Gain

3.928

.439

Loss

4.089

.469

Table A9. Means and standard errors for mean amplitude of probability
Salience

Mean

Std. Error

High

4.085

.424

Low

3.931

.482
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Table A10. Analysis of variance for mean latency of value
Source
Value

SS

df

MS

F

1374.061

3.287

418.074

23342.739

105.173

221.947

24716.800

108.459

640.021

Sig.

1.884

.131

Error(Value)

Total

Table A11. Means and standard deviations for mean latency of value

Value
HG

Mean

HL
LG
LL
N

Std.
Deviation

326.6667

21.85559

329.4545

21.79032

332.6061

18.97686

334.9091

20.30450

332.7273

19.65845

Table A12. Analysis of variance for mean latency of probability and valence
Source
Salience

SS

df

MS

1071.030

1

1071.030

6088.970

32

190.280

213.818

1

213.818

6274.182

32

196.068

1.939

1

1.939

5286.061

32

165.189

18936.000

99

1838

F

Sig.

5.629

.024*

1.091

.304

.012

.914

Error (Salience)

Valence
Error (Valence)

Salience * Valence
Error (Salience*Valence)
Total

* p < .05
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Table A13. Means and standard error for mean latency of valence
Std.
Error

Valence

Mean

Gain

329.636

3.110

Loss

332.182

3.328

Table A14. Means and standard errors for mean latency of probability

Salience

Mean

Std. Error

High

328.061

3.279

Low

333.758

3.148
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Figure A1. Learning rates as a function of ‘Gain’ and ‘Loss’ values with standard deviations as
standard error bars (SD +/- 1).
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Figure A2. Behavioral accuracy as a function of value with standard deviations as standard
error bars (SD +/- 1).
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Figure A3. Grand Average at midline parietal electrode (Pz) from -196 ms to 800 ms.
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Figure A4. Mean P3 amplitude as a function of value with standard deviations as standard error
bars (SD +/- 1).
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Figure A5. Mean P3 amplitude as a function of valence with standard error bars.
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Figure A6. Mean P3 amplitude as a function of probability with error bars.
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Figure A7. Mean P3 amplitude as a function of probability and valence with standard deviations
as error bars (SD +/- 1).
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Figure A8. Mean latency as a function of value with standard deviations as standard error bars
(SD +/- 1).
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Figure A9. Mean latency as a function of valence with standard deviations as standard error
bars (SD +/- 1).
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Figure A10. Mean latency as a function of probability with standard deviations as standard
error bars (SD +/- 1).
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Figure A11. Mean latency as a function of probability and valence with standard deviations as
standard error bars (SD +/- 1).

